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NOTEE
DRAFTING MARITAL DEDUCTION PROVISIONS
With the advent of Section 812(e) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1948
(now Section 2056 of the 1954 Code, as amended), a new device for federal
estate tax savings was born. Since that date the "marital deduction" has be-
come one of the most important considerations in estate planning.
Briefly, Section 2056 permits a deduction to the extent of fifty per cent
of the value of the adjusted gross estate ' of that property which passes or has
passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, provided the value of the
property is included in the value of the gross estate.' Any "terminable in-
terest" passing to the surviving spouse cannot be deducted, 3 but the Code pro-
vides for three exceptions to this rule.' Since this article will discuss the
drafting of provisions when a "marital deduction" trust is involved, it is im-
portant to specifically note only one of these exceptions. Where the decedent
in his will creates a life estate together with a general power of appointment
in the surviving spouse,' the property passing under this provision will qual-
ify for the "marital deduction." '
This deduction is applicable only where the interest passes from the
decedent to the surviving spouse. An interest is considered as passing from
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(1). Adjusted gross estate is defined in section
2056(c) (2) (A) as the value of the gross estate less expenses, indebtedness, taxes and losses arising
from fires, storms, shipwrecks, or other casualties during the settlement of the estate, provided the
estate is not compensated for these losses.2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
UINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(1). The Regulations, § 20.2056(b)-1(b) defines a
"terminable interest" in property as "an interest which will terminate or fail on the lapse of time
or on the occurrence or the failure to occur of some contingency." This property interest is non-
deductible if another interest in said property passes or has passed from the decedent to another
without full consideration, and the other person or his heirs may enjoy or possess some part of
said property after the termination or failure of the surviving spouse's interest by reason of said
passing. In no case is said interest deductible when the executor or trustee, pursuant to decedent's
directions, acquires said interest for the surviving spouse.
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (3), (5) and (6) expressly state the three exceptions
to the "terminable interest" rule. Even though the property interest is a "terminable interest,"
it is deductible if the interest is terminable only because (1) it is conditioned upon survivorship
of the spouse for six months or less and in fact the termination does not occur; (2) it is a right
in the surviving spouse to income for life (in trust or otherwise) coupled with a general power
of appointment; or (3) it is life insurance, an endowment or an annuity contract held by the
insurer coupled with a general power of appointment in the surviving spouse.
'Prior to 1954 this exception was applicable only where the surviving spouse had a life
estate with a general power of appointment. In 1954 the Code was changed to include a trust
agreement where the surviving spouse was the income beneficiary for life, and the survivor also
had a general power of appointment.
OINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
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the decedent to another when it is bequeathed, devised, inherited, transferred
by decedent at any time, held in joint ownership with a right of survivorship,
when it is the proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent, or a dower or
curtesy interest.! The Internal Revenue Bureau has ruled that this deduction
cannot be waived by the surviving spouse or her estate.'
Generally, the insertion of a "marital deduction" provision in a will is
an estate tax saving device where the spouse, who owns less than one-half of
the combined property, gains upon the death of the other spouse title or access
to about one-half of the combined property included in the estate of the latter.
Savings become greater as the size of the decedent's estate increases. Some
factors to consider in determining whether a person should take advantage
of this deduction are'as follows: Does the spouse have good business judg-
ment? Is it likely that funds in the spouse's control will be dissipated? Does
the spouse have an aversion to control? What is the estimated value of the
use of funds saved by exercising the deduction? What is the probable value
of each spouse's estate? Are the assets of the estate liquid or non-liquid?
What is the health, age, and relationship of the family unit? '
Within the short span of twelve years, the "marital deduction" has been
given considerable thought by all estate planners. In its infancy many articles
were written concerning various aspects of the deduction with a view toward
obtaining the maximum tax benefit without unnecessarily over-qualifying
property." It is the purpose of this article to consider some of the drafting
problems which arise when attempting to utilize the deduction. Recent cases
and administrative rulings have illustrated a need for continuous re-evaluation
and clarification of language designed to achieve the maximum tax benefits.
In order to qualify as property passing to the spouse, either in trust or
as an outright bequest, the property must pass or have passed from the de-
cedent to the surviving spouse and be included in the decedent's gross estate."
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2056(e)(1) to 2056(e) (7).
8 Rev. Rul. 59-123, 1959 INT. REV. BULL. No. 13, at 11.
9 For purposes of clarification in this note, it is assumed the husband will die first and the
wife will survive. For a discussion of these factors see Lefever, When and How to Take the Marital
Deduction, 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES 644 (1950); COOPER, Marital Deduction Choice, 91 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 140 (1952); SAMMOND, Marital Deduction-Use and Form of the Marital Bequest,
38 MARQ. L. REV. 169 (1954).
10 E.g., PARKS, Introduction to Marital Deduction under Federal Estate Tax Law, 23 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 295 (1951); LAWTHERS, Basic Planning Principles in Qualifying Life Insurance for
the Marital Deduction, 37 TAXES 723 (1959); SAMMOND, supra, note 9; SMITH, Marital De-
duction in Estate Planning, 32 TAXES 15 (1954); CASNER, Estate Planning-Marital Deduction
Provisions of Trusts, 64 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1951).
11 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a). For an article concerning problems in qualifying
property, see AKER, Pennsylvania Comments on Current Estate Tax Problems in Qualifying Prop-
erty for the Marital Deduction, 62 DICK. L. REV. 111 (1958).
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The burden is on the executor to show the spouse survived. 12  Although this
requirement causes no problem in most cases, assume the husband and wife
died under such circumstances that there was insufficient evidence to prove
who died first. The Regulations state, "a presumption (whether supplied by
local law, the decedent's will, or otherwise) that the decedent was survived
by his spouse will be recognized" as satisfying the requirements that the de-
cedent was survived by his spouse. (Emphasis added.) 1 When Pennsylvania
law is examined, we find that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act applies,
provided the will does not create a contrary presumption.14 The statute cre-
ates a presumption that each person's property is "disposed of as if he had
survived." Applying this presumption to the "surviving spouse" requirement,
the "marital deduction" will not be allowed.1" Hence, assuming the "marital
deduction" is desirable in the first instance, it is essential that the will drafter
create a presumption to counteract the possibility that the deduction may be
disallowed. A provision creating a presumption that the decedent died first
would control the order of deaths and permit utilization of the deduction.
Three different clauses have been suggested as possible provisions for in-
sertion in the will of the decedent in order to preserve the deduction under
these circumstances.10 An example of one clause follows: In the event my
wife and I die as a result of a common accident, she shall be presumed to have
survived me. This clause, known as a "common disaster" clause, accomplishes
very little that could not be accomplished by another type of clause, and it has
serious disadvantages. The clause does provide for the situation where hus-
band and wife die as a result of the same disaster, but it does not encompass
the situation where the spouses die from unrelated causes at approximately
the same time. In addition, the use of this clause could create a problem
of proving a causal connection between the injury and death, especially if
the survivor remained alive for several months. Since the beneficiary could
not be determined until it is established whether she died as a result of the
common accident, there could not be an ultimate distribution of the estate
during this period. Most important, the Regulations provide that the "marital
deduction" will be completely lost if there is a possibility the surviving spouse
could be deprived of the property in the final audit of the return by the opera-
tion of this provision.
17
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-1(b)(1) (1958).
13 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(e) (1958).
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 521, 526 (1941).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a) requires that the spouse survive the decedent.
16 BowE, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION § 2.7 (1957).
17Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3(c) (1958).
1960.]
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The other types of clauses suggested are a "time" clause 1 and a "simul-
taneous death" clause.'9 Generally, the "time" clause should be used where
the estates of the spouses are about equal and one spouse is expected to live
many years after the decedent. Certainly, this clause would not cause a litiga-
tion problem. Persons should be cautioned, however, that the property pass-
ing to the surviving spouse will not qualify for the deduction if the time period
exceeds six months after the decedent dies."0
On the other hand, the "simultaneous death" clause is probably most
desirable where the decedent owns the bulk of the estate and wants the de-
duction to be allowed under all circumstances, because the overall estate tax
will be less. By using this clause, the property devised to the spouse would
pass through her estate when they both died under such circumstances that
proof could not be obtained to determine which person died first.
Although the "terminable interest" rule may prevent utilization of the
deduction, Section 2056(b) (3) excludes from its scope the situation where
the bequest is conditioned upon death of the surviving spouse within six
months after decedent's death or as a result of a common disaster, but only
when the condition does not in fact occur. Several courts have been con-
fronted with the problem of applying this provision when the estate has claimed
a "marital deduction" and the property was given to the wife upon condition
that she be living at the date of distribution. The Regulations specifically
set forth this example and say that the bequest or devise is not a deductible
interest even when distribution has taken place within six months after de-
cedent's death and the spouse survived the date of distribution.21  One case,
without looking to state law, has affirmed the Regulation. 2 However, sev-
eral decisions have permitted the deduction when the distribution was, in fact,
made within six months and the surviving spouse was living. These cases
were supported either on the ground that under state law the devise or be-
quest to the wife was vested and unconditional at the moment of death, 2 or
18 E.g., In the event my wife dies within - days after my death, she shall now be
deemed to have survived me for purposes of this will.
19 E.g., In the event that my wife and I die under such circumstances that there is insufficient
evidence to establish who survived, I hereby declare that my wife shall be deemed to have survived
me and this provision [and all the provisions of this will] shall be construed upon that assumption.
See EDMONDS, Marital Dedtaction Pointers, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 389, 391 (1951).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (3). For a discussion of specific circumstances when
the "time" clause or the "simultaneous death" clause should be used see BowE, ESTATE PLANNING
AND TAXATION §§ 2.7, 2.19, 5.14-5.17 (1957).
21 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3(d) (4) (1958).
22 California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.Cal. 1955).
28Steele v. U.S., 146 F. Supp. 316 (Mont. 1956); Smith v. U.S., 158 F. Supp. 344 (Col.
1957); Estate of Martinson v. Wright. 59-2 USTC § 11,910 (1959).
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on the ground that the language was ambigous and void. 4 Even in the
face of these latter decisions, Pennsylvania drafters of a "marital deduction"
provision should not insert this condition. One reason for this conclusion is
that the court might say the Regulations should be followed and allow no
deduction. Furthermore, if the court should look to Pennsylvania law, it
would undoubtedly follow In re Wraught Estate. 5 In this case the decedent
devised the residue to his wife "absolutely and in fee simple," but "should
my said wife die before the settlement of my estate, then" to Alfaretta M.
Hale. The wife died six months after the husband and before settlement and
distribution had been completed. The court held that Hale was entitled to
the residue. This case was followed in a lower court case, McElroy's Estate,"8
where the decedent devised realty to her husband, but "should my husband
be deceased before distribution is made . . . I then direct that his share" be
given to the Burkes. When the husband died, there had been no distribution
of the estate. The court held the husband's interest was contingent and upon
his death his interest vested in the other beneficiaries.7 On the basis of these
cases, a resident of Pennsylvania should not insert such a provision in his will
when he plans to take advantage of the "marital deduction."
The most important aspect for will drafters to consider is the actual
wording of a provision, in order to take full advantage of the deduction while
at the same time minimizing problems for the estate after the decedent dies.
It will be merely coincidence if the drafter accomplishes the first objective by
the use of a "specific dollar" bequest to the wife.2 Generally, the assets of
an individual will vary between the time his will is written and his date of
death. A person could seldom have any assurance that his estate would ob-
tain the maximum "marital deduction" without devising the survivor more
property than necessary. The ultimate result of the latter alternative would
24 Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F. 2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954). This court remanded the case to the
district court. The district court held the clause was void at 138 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. So. Dak.
1956).
25 347 Pa. 165, 32 A. 2d 8 (1943).
26 59 Pa. Montg. Co. L. Rec. 304 (1943).
27 See also Golling Estate, 5 Pa. Fid. Rep. 320 (1955) where the court held the issue of a
brother took the interest of the brother who survived the testator and died prior to distribution
of the estate (about four years, seven months later) when the devise was to the brothers and sisters
"or the issue of any who may not survive me or be not living at the time of distribution of my
estate." For the same result see Wieand Estate, 7 Pa. Fid. Rep. 200 (1956) and Tyson Estate, 7
Pa. Fid. Rep. 206 (1957).
The only exception to this rule in Pennsylvania appears to exist where the executors deliberately
delay distribution. In this situation McClure's Estate, 221 Pa. 556 (1908) held that property
was vested. Since the account cannot be filed for six months unless directed by the court [PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.701 (1949)) there probably would be no deliberate delay within this
time, so the "terminable interest" rule would apply and disallow the "marital deduction."




be unnecessary payment of death taxes by the surviving spouse's estate after
her death. Also, in most cases the end result of a "specific dollar" bequest
is capital gains or losses to the estate because property may have to be con-
verted into cash to pay the legacy. However, if an individual is willing to
make frequent revisions in his will-every time some of his assets change
hands or value-a "specific dollar" bequest would certainly simplify the ad-
ministration of his estate. When considering the practical aspects though,
this type of bequest should never be used for "marital deduction" purposes.
Because it is impractical to use the "specific dollar" bequest when at-
tempting to obtain the maximum tax deduction, most will drafters have sug-
gested the use of a formula clause to accomplish the desired results. 9 These
persons are not however, in complete agreement concerning the type of formula
clause that should be used in any given case.2 Some drafters and trust officers
have suggested using a "pecuniary" formula," but most of them have advo-
cated the use of a "fractional" formula.1
2
Although it is not the major concern of this note to discuss the relative
merits of each formula, a few general observations may prove helpful. When
the "pecuniary" formula is employed, the maximum deduction is achieved in
terms of a fixed dollar amount. The result is precise and there are very few
interpretative problems. However, when this legacy is satisfied in kind and
the assets have appreciated over the estate tax value, this appreciation will be
treated as a capital gain to the estate for income tax purposes.3" Also, since
the executor may satisfy the dollar amount out of any assets, whether they
have depreciated or appreciated in value, he has the power to vary the actual
amount distributed to the "marital deduction" trust unless there is a direc-
tional provision. This situation may create serious consequences where the
beneficiaries of the "marital" trust and the "non-marital" trust have conflict-
ing interests."4 When the words, "one-half (1/) of the residue," are used,
29 CASNER, supra note 10; LEFEVER, supra note 9; SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER
HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1953); MCGORRY, Pecuniary or Fractional Formula? 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES
422 (1959); SMITH, supra note 10; EDMONDS, Marital Deduction Pointers, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES
389 (1951); FLEMING, Provisions for Trusts and Powers of Appointment, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
FORUM, 1951 at 341-343.
90 E.g., McGORRY, supra note 29; CASNER, supra note 10; SMITH, supra note 10; MANN-
HEIMER, WHEELER & FRIEDMAN, The Use of a Formula Clause for the Marital Deduction, 32
TAXES 381 (1954).
31 E.g., SMITH, supra note 10; IVES, Hints on Will Drafting, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 519, 520
(1951).
32 E.g., MCGORRY, supra note 29; LOVELL, Administering the Marital Deduction-A Summary
of Five Years Experience, 92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 812, 813 (1953); CASNER, Fractional Share Mar-
ital Deduction Gifts, 39 TRUST BULL. 42 (March 1960).
33 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 641-3.




a different result will be reached depending upon whether or not money for
death taxes, administration expenses, etc. is to come out of the residue. To
alleviate this problem a will must contain a clear and concise definition of
the "residue." On the other hand, when a "fractional share" formula is in-
serted, a specific definition of the residue is immaterial because the fraction
is self-adjusting. For example, assame the residue is composed of assets
valued at $300,000. If the fraction is 110,000/300,000, then the marital share
will be $110,000. If the administration expenses ($30,000) are to be de-
ducted from the $300,000 in order to determine the residue, then the fraction
will be 110,000/270,000 and the marital share will still be $110,000.
In addition to achieving maximum tax benefits, the use of the "fractional"
formula causes no capital gain or loss problems because the surviving spouse
obtains a fractional share of each asset at the time of distribution. This is
especially true where the share is based upon federal estate tax values. Nat-
urally, since the fractional share of each asset is distributed under this formula,
there would be less reason for family disputes. However, the flexibility per-
mitted the executor, when the "pecuniary" formula is used, could be very
desirable where the widow is in ill health and owns a medium-sized estate
herself.
After carefully selecting the formula which will accomplish the results
desired by your client, there arises a more difficult problem of correctly word-
ing the "marital" trust provisions. During the short history of this deduction
many faults have been corrected by experts in the field through careful analy-
sis of the Code, the Regulations and cases, but problems still exist when one
attempts to interpret specific language used in a particular will.
For purposes of this discussion, suppose two separate trusts, composed of
property in the residuary estate, are contemplated."8 This note will be lim-
ited to the language which should be employed when establishing the "marital
deduction" trust. Generally, the first section of the will creating the trust,
when the trust property is composed of part of the residue, should read as
follows: I give, devise and bequeath all the residue of my estate, of whatever
nature and wherever situated, as follows: .... sT
35 For an extensive discussion of this general problem see Casner, supra note 32. See
infra page 430 for information concerning the specific terms of the fraction.
86 Naturally, the "marital" trust may be completely separated from the residuary bequest. One
trust may be created with a specific portion thereof set off as the "marital" bequest, but this is
not advised. Finally, the "marital" bequest may be poured over into an existing inter vivos trust
for the benefit of the surviving spouse, or into an existing funded or unfunded life insurance trust.
For an article dealing specifically with the "pour-over" problems, see Schenck, The "Pour-Over"
Technique in Estate Planning, 38 TAxEs 57 (1960); CASNER, supra note 10.
8 For other examples, see CASNER, supra note 10 at 584, 585, and MCGORRY, supra note 29.
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Immediately following this section should appear the "marital deduction"
trust. To illustrate the problems that can arise when interpreting one of these
provisions, set forth below is the language of a "marital" trust that was the
basis for litigation in the case of In re Estate of Kantner 8
Third: If my wife, Arlene M. Kantner, survives me, I direct my Execu-
tors and Trustees to set aside a portion of my estate equal in value to (a) one-
half of the value of my adjusted gross estate (gross taxable estate less funeral
and administration expenses and claims and debts but before the deduction
of estate or inheritance taxes) as finally determined for Federal estate tax
purposes, less (b) the value of all interests in property, if any, which pass or
have passed to my wife under other provisions of this Will or otherwise than
under this Will, but only to the extent that such interests are for the pur-
poses of the Federal estate tax included in determining my gross taxable estate
and are allowable as a marital deduction. All values shall be those finally
determined for Federal Estate tax purposes.39
The court held this language created a general legacy of a specific dollar
amount, although it was also contended the provision was a formula clause
bequeathing a fractional share of the residue.
In accordance with the discussion concerning "time" clauses and "simul-
taneous death" clauses, one of these clauses, or a similar statement, should be
inserted in parenthesis immediately following the words, "survives me," in
the first line.
The court in the Kantner case construed the phrase, "portion of my estate
equal in value to (a) one-half of the value of my adjusted gross estate," as
a "pecuniary" formula, since it was not part of the residue. Also, in King v.
Citizens & Southern Nat'l. Bank of Atlanta 4 the words, "fifty percentum
(507o) of my adjusted gross estate, as the same is defined for Federal Estate
Tax purposes," were construed as creating a "pecuniary" formula. The court
said the result was a "specific dollar" bequest.41 Accordingly, the widow did
not share in the economic gain of assets during the course of administration
and she was not entitled to income from the assets during this time. Since it
was argued in both cases that the language created a fractional share interest,
it is apparent that wills should be written in such a manner as to eliminate
any possibility of dispute concerning the type of bequest intended. This in-
tent can be clearly indicated by inserting phraseology similar to the following:
38 50 N.J. Super. 582, 143 A. 2d 243, aff'd, 52 N.J. Super. 24, 144 A. 2d 553 (1958).
39 Id. at 583, 143 A. 2d at 244.
40 103 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
41 The same result was reached on the basis of similar language in In re Lewis' Will, 115
N.Y.S. 2d 791 (1952).
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It is my intent by the use of the above language in Trust A to create a frac-
tional share interest.
In addition, when an individual wishes to give the surviving spouse a
fractional share of the estate, the following language, coupled with the prior
clause, is suggested: I direct my Executors and Trustees to set aside that frac-
tional share of 'the residuary estate which will equal the maximum estate tax
marital deduction. .... This language has the advantage of stating a "frac-
tional share," and, consequently, no revision would be necessary if Congress
in the future changed the per cent of the adjusted gross estate which is de-
ductible. However, unless subsequent language is used in the will, this clause
may be construed as compelling the executor to pick the valuation date which
will give the wife the maximum value of property passing into the "marital"
trust, In fact, where a will devised "an amount which shall equal one-half
the value of my 'adjusted gross estate'," as defined by the Code, reduced by
the aggregate amount of marital deductions in respect of property passing
other than by this clause, a New York court held in Matter of Inman that the
property in the marital trust must produce the maximum marital deduction
possible.43 In effect, this language eliminated the executor's power to choose
the valuation date. Concerning this possible disadvantage, this interpretation
could be thwarted by a statement similar to the following: It is my intent to
permit the executor to choose the valuation date which he, in his uncontrolled
discretion, deems to be in the best interests of the estate. It is noted that con-
tradictory terms would be incorporated in the will if the interpretation in the
Inman case," a lower court case in New York, is followed. While the in-
corporation of contradictory statements in a will should be avoided, if pos-
sible, a rule of construction adopted by many cases in this circumstance is
that the last stated intent controls.4" Hence, assuming the Inman case will be
followed, it appears the will drafter could assure maximum tax benefits, as
well as discretion to choose the valuation date by the insertion of the above-
suggested statement in the will. Of course, there would be no conflict where
the will directed the executor to choose the valuation date which would place
the maximum amount of property in the "marital" trust.
Where the gross estate for federal tax purposes is likely to be under
$120,000, the words, "which will equal the maximum estate tax marital de-
42 See also McGORRY, supra note 29 and Sammond, supra note 9 at 178.
43 Matter of Inman, N.Y.L.J., Surr. Ct., N.Y. Co., decided Dec. 15, 1959.
44Ibid.
45 King v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of Atlanta, 103 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958);
In re Conner's Estate, 286 Pa. 382, 133 Atl. 545 (1926); Fisher Will, 355 Pa. 105, 49 A. 2d 376
(1946); Richley Estate, 394 Pa. 188, 146 A. 2d 281 (1958).
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duction" should be changed to read, which will be sufficient to reduce the
federal estate tax to its lowest amount. In order to illustrate the reason for
this change, assume the gross estate for federal tax purposes is $100,000. The
administration expenses are $10,000 and there are no claims against the estate.
Applying the first-mentioned language, the "marital deducation" would be
valued at $45,000 (1/2 the residue before taxes). However, since there is a
$60,000 exemption,46 only $30,000 would be necessary to reduce the federal
estate tax payable to zero. In addition to obtaining no tax benefit on the extra
$15,000 in the decedent's estate, the survivor would be required to include
the total $45,000 in her gross estate. On the other hand, if the other language
is inserted in the will, the value of the amount distributed to the "marital"
trust would be $30,000 and only this amount would be includible in the sur-
vivor's estate.
A second possible disadvantage has been suggested by Mr. McGorry, 7
who contends that the executor and the courts might be faced with a problem
of determining the actual terms of the fraction. Hence, he suggested that
will drafters expressly set forth the terms of the fraction in a manner similar
to the following: The numerator shall consist of the difference between the
maximum tax benefits allowable to my estate for federal estate tax purposes
and the qualifying property which passes or has passed to my wife under other
provisions of this Will or otherwise and have been included in my gross estate.
The denominator shall be the amount of the residue before taxes. However,
cases to date have apparently had little difficulty determining the terms of the
fraction. In view of this fact it seems the suggestion is not essential to a
proper interpretation of the "fractional" formula. Nevertheless, the inser-
tion of such a clause would certainly clarify any possible ambiguity and, there-
fore, prevent any litigation concerning the fraction.
When the "pecuniary" formula is intended, the drafter should state this
intent by inserting the following language: It is my intent to create a pe-
cuniary or fixed dollar bequest by the above provisions. Also, be certain a
per cent of the adjusted gross estate, as determined for federal tax purposes, is
stated. The will should always refer to the "adjusted gross estate," and not
just the "estate," because, in the latter instance some courts have construed
this to include all property passing under the will and subject to administra-
tion; "8 other courts have construed it as including the gross estate less debts
46 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2052.
47 McGorry, supra note 29.




and funeral expenses only; " and still others have construed it as being the
net or distributable part of the estate after debts and administration expenses
were deducted.5"
Returning to the quoted bequest in the Kantner case, there appears to be
no reason for specifically defining the "adjusted gross estate," especially since
it is set forth in section 2056(c) (2) of the Code.5 Additionally, the phrase,
"as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes," clearly indicates what
"adjusted gross estate" should be considered. This latter phrase is very im-
portant to good drafting of wills in order to satisfy the "marital deduction"
requirements. Without this phrase, a court might refer to state law for a
definition of "adjusted gross estate" and this definition could readily differ
from the one set forth in the Code. Where such a difference existed, the re-
sult would be that the testator either would not achieve the maximum deduc-
tion or he would over-qualify property for the deduction.
When using a "pecuniary" formula, it is most important to include the
following language: less the value of all interests in property, if any, which
pass or have passed to my wife under other provisions of this Will or other-
wise. This clause will reduce the dollar value of property qualifying for the
deduction so that the surviving spouse will receive no more than the maximum
amount by which the decedent's estate will benefit. For example, In re Reben's
Will 62 lacked this phraseology and as a result the wife received more prop-
erty than was necessary for the estate to obtain maximum benefits. Also,
this property would be taxed again in the estate of the wife."'
This clause is also an important addition to a "fractional" formula pro-
vision because it reduces the numerator of the fraction so that the widow will
receive only the maximum amount by which the estate will benefit. For ex-
ample, assume H, who was married to W, died with an adjusted gross estate
valued for federal estate tax purposes at $500,000. This estate was composed
of the following:
Securities in H's name ..................................... $300,000
Residence held as tenancy by entirety ........................ 50,000
Small business in H's name ................................. . oo,ooo
Bonds held as tenancy by entirety ............................ 50,000
49 Benn Estate, 75 Pa. Montg. L. Rec. 416 (1959).
50 Barnett's Appeal, 104 Pa. 342 (1884); Martin Estate, 59 Pa. D. & C. 529 (1947).
51 "The adjusted gross estate shall . . . be computed by subtracting from the entire value
of the gross estate the aggregate amount of the deductions allowed by sections 2053 and 2054"
(expense and loss deductions).
52 115 N.Y.S. 2d (1952).




Without the insertion of such a provision, the numerator of the fraction would
be one-half the value of the "adjusted gross estate," or $250,000; the denom-
inator would be $500,000, the value of the residue before taxes. Hence, in
addition to receiving, through joint ownership, property valued at $100,000
(securities and residence), W would also receive $250,000 as her fractional
share under the "marital" trust provision. Thus, to the extent of $100,000,
H's estate would receive no tax benefit, and when W dies, her estate would
also be taxed on the total amount. However, if the provision were inserted
in the "marital" trust, the numerator of the fraction would only be $150,000
(one-half the adjusted gross estate less property which qualifies for the de-
duction and passes to W other than through the trust) and the denominator
would be the residue before taxes, or $500,000. When this fractional share
(3/10) is multiplied by the residue, the amount included in the "marital"
trust is $150,000. W would still receive $100,000 not subject to the trust,
but the total amount received by W and includible in her estate when she
dies would be only the amount by which the estate could benefit through opera-
tion of this deduction.
However, this clause should always be qualified by the phrase, but only
to the extent that such interests are included in my gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes and only to the extent such interests qualify for the mar-
ital deduction. Without this phrasing, the "marital deduction" trust would
receive very little property in many instances. Conceivably, all property ever
received by the surviving spouse from the decedent during his lifetime would
serve to reduce the amount going to the survivor, even though it would not
be included in decedent's estate and it would not be property which would
qualify for the deduction. 4
All will drafters should insert in the "marital" trust a provision to the
effect that the final determinations in the federal estate tax proceedings shall
control the computations to determine this fractional share [pecuniary be-
quest] 5 and only assets qualifying for the marital deduction shall pass into
Trust A. This provision definitely establishes the property to be valued when
making the computations, how it is to be valued and assures the fact that only
property which qualifies for the deduction can be included in the corpus of
Trust A. Without this provision, the executor could easily use another basis
for determining the share and he could place non-qualifying property in the
54 1n Estate of Hoetzel v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 384 (1957) the will reduced the "marital"
provision by such portions of decedent's estate which passed to his wife outside the probate estate.
In that case the court reduced the bequest by the value of non-qualifying assets passing to the
wife outside the will.
55 Insert the name of whichever clause is intended.
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trust. In this event the amount of the deduction would probably be consid-
erably less than the maximum permitted by the Code.
It is noted that the executor may choose the valuation date for federal
estate tax purposes. " If the executor so elects he may value all property in
decedent's gross estate as of one year after decedent's death. If property is
distributed, sold or disposed of within the year, the value is determined as of
the date the property is disposed. However, if mere lapse of time affects the
interest it must be valued as of the date of death with adjustments for a dif-
ference in value not due to mere lapse of time.
This discretion becomes important where the assets may appreciate or
depreciate in value after the death of the testator and before distribution. A
provision should be inserted in the will to state the testator's intent in this
regard. In many cases it would be best to explicitly give the executor dis-
cretion to choose the date upon consideration of all the circumstances. Al-
though not within the scope of this note, it should be mentioned that the
executor could reduce the estate's income taxes in many cases by selecting the
higher valuation. However, if the estate is relatively small and the wife has
no estate of her own, it might be well to direct the executor to choose the
evaluation date which will place the larger amount in the "marital" trust.
Also, the same instruction should be carefully considered where there is a
possibility of conflict between the surviving spouse and the devisees of the
residue. For example, this situation could easily arise where the second wife
is the beneficiary of the "marital" trust and children of a prior marriage are
recipients of the residue or trust created out of the residue. Without such a
provision, the executor could be faced with conflicting interests and pressure
could be applied by all devisees to choose the evaluation date most favorable
to their interests. Another possibility is to direct the executor to elect the
estate tax valuation date that will result in the lesser federal estate tax. One
instance where this provision appears advisable is when the testator has a
large estate and the wife is his major or only concern.
The executor's discretion is also involved concerning the deduction of
administration expenses. These expenses can be deducted on the estate tax
return " or on the income tax return filed by the estate, "8 but in most instances
56 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032. For a discussion of changes in values between the tax
date selected and final distribution, see Smith, How to Provide for Changes in Marital Deduction
Values Between Tax Date and Final Distribution, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 16 (1951). For a general
discussion of various provisions concerning the executor and trustee of the "marital" trust, see
GOLDEN, A Decade with the Marital Deduction, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 304 (1958).
57 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053.
58 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213.
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they cannot be deducted on both returns.5" In the absence of a provision in
the will, the executor has discretion to deduct from either return. In most
cases this discretion should be given, because the executor could investigate
the circumstances and take the deduction from either return, depending upon
which deduction would result in the greater tax savings. The courts are not
in agreement as to whether this election will have any effect on the amount
of property passing under the "marital deduction" trust. In Matter of In-
man,0 the will was silent on this question and the executors elected to take
administration expenses as income tax deductions, thereby increasing the
amount included in the marital trust. The court held this to be proper, espe-
cially where the testator's intent to provide for the maximum deduction would
be frustrated by a deduction from the estate tax. An opposite result was
reached in Estate of Rooney v. Commissioner,6 a tax court case. Here again,
the executor took a deduction for administration expenses on the fiduciary's
income tax return and then claimed a marital deduction on the basis of the
residuary estate without reduction for administration expenses. The tax court
held that the value of property passing into the "marital deduction" trust must
be reduced by the amount of administration expenses chargeable under the
state law to such residue, even though expenses were properly deducted on
the income tax return. In this case, the expenses were apparently payable, at
least in part, from the "marital" share. It appears that the Rooney decision is
more consistent with the precise language of Section 2056(c). This section
states that the deductions "shall not exceed 50 per cent of the value of the
adjusted gross estate," and section 2056(c) (2) defines adjusted gross estate
as the entire value of the gross estate less the aggregate amount of deductions
allowed by Sections 2053 and 2054.62 Since these deductions are allowed by
the section, it should be immaterial whether they are actually taken on the
estate tax return or the estate's income tax return; the "marital deduction"
should be computed as if the deductions were taken on the estate tax return,
provided the money to pay these expenses was taken from the residue. Also,
when construing Section 2056(e), which states, "where at the time of the de-
cedent's death it is not possible to ascertain the particular person or persons
to whom an interest in property may pass from the decedent, such interest
59 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 213(d), 642(g). For a general discussion concerning this
election see BENNION, Deductions on Estate or Income Return, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 128 (1951);
see FLEMING, Income and Principal Adjustments Where Administration Expenses Used as Income
Tax Deductions, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1089 (1957); LEWIS, Shifting of Deductions from Estate to
Income Tax Returns, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 936 (1958); GOLDEN, Solving Three Administrative
Problems Under Marital Deduction, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 421 (1958).
60 Supra note 43.
61 33T.C. -, No. 89 (1960), 2 CCH FED. ESTATE & GIFT TAX REPORTER, ff 8548. See
also Estate of Luehrmann v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. -, No. 32 (1959).
62 The deductions allowed are expenses of the estate and losses from fire, etc.
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shall ...be considered as passing from the decedent to a person other than
the surviving spouse" and thus not qualify for the deduction, it would seem
the executor's choice of where he takes the deductions should be immaterial
for "marital deduction" purposes. He should be deemed to elect from the
gross estate, as the Rooney case held, since he must decide in favor of persons
other than the surviving spouse when payment of these expenses is made
from the residue. However, when the executor actually pays these bills out
of the income of the estate which is attributable to the "non-marital" share,
it seems the Revenue Rulings would not require the executor to reduce the
"adjusted gross estate" for "marital deduction" purposes unless he claimed
the deductions on the estate tax return.63
All wills should contains a clause providing that death taxes shall be
paid out of property other than that included in the marital deduction trust.
This is especially true if the trust is created out of part of the residue of the
estate. Without such a proviso, it has been held that the survivor's share
should be reduced by the amount of estate and death taxes attributable to
it.64 The ultimate result is that an alegbraic formula would be necessary to
determine the specific amount of each deduction.6  However, even without
this clause Pennsylvania cases have held that the widow's marital deduction
should not be diminished by the amount of federal estate tax attributable to
her share. One reason for this result is the application of the Pennsylvania
Tax Apportionment Act of 1951.66 Another stated reason is that it would be
inequitable to permit other beneficiaries to share in a "marital deduction"
exemption which was provided solely for the surviving spouse.67 Neverthe-
less, in Babcock v. Commissioner 68 the court said the Pennsylvania Inheritance
Tax on the wife's share should reduce the federal marital deduction in so
far as the Pennsylvania tax was not absorbed as a credit against the federal
estate tax. The tax was less than the allowable credit in this case, so the de-
63 Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 CuM. BUL. 386; Rev. Rul. 55-255, 1955-1 Cum. BUL. 460.
64 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E. 2d 879 (1953); Northern Trust
Co. v. Wilson, 344 Il1. App. 508, 101 N.E. 2d 604 (1951); In re Will of Uihlein, 264 Wis. 362,
59 N.W. 2d 641, 38 A.L.R. 2d 961 (1953). For a discussion of most cases deciding this problem,
see Golden, rupra note 56 at 358-359.
6 5 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1958).
66 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 881-887 (1951).
67 Rosenfeld Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A. 2d 684 (1954); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F. 2d 486
(4th Cir. 1955); Hagey Estate, 8 Pa. Fid. Rep. 301 (1958); Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Huber, 240 S.W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1951); Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. 2d 9
(1952); In re Peters' Will, 204 Misc. 333, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 142 (1949).
68234 F. 2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956). See also In re Elliott's Estate, 78 Pa. D. & C. 406 (1952);
In re Clark's Estate, 8 Pa. D. & C. 2d 665 (1958). In the latter case the court said that a deduc-
tion on Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax was permitted the surviving wife to the extent that payment
thereof would be used as a credit against the federal estate tax, but the wife must participate in




duction was not reduced. However, the Babcock case illustrates the need for
a provision in the will to eliminate the possibility that the deduction may be
reduced. The following provision should be inserted in the will when there
is assurance that the amount in the residue will be adequate to cover the taxes
on the entire estate: All estate, inheritance and other death taxes (including
interest and penalties thereon) payable by reason of my death with respect to
all property included in my gross estate for death tax purposes, whether or
not such property shall pass under this will, shall be paid exclusively out of
that portion of my residuary estate not passing pursuant to the "~marital de-
duction" trust. 9
If the residue not passing into the "marital" trust is not sufficient to pay
all taxes, then the above provision should be altered by providing that the
taxes be paid from parts of the estate other than that part passing under the
"marital deduction" trust. Or, in the alternative, the said trust should not
be made a part of the residuary estate.
Where there is a life estate with a power of appointment in the surviving
spouse (whether in trust or outright), five conditions must be met to qualify
interests in property passing to the surviving spouse for the deduction:
(1) The survivor must be entitled to all income from the entire interest
or a specific portion of the entire interest, or to a specific portion of
all income from the entire interest; and
(2) The income must be payable annually or more frequently; and
(3) The survivor must have power to appoint the entire interest or a
specific portion thereof to herself or her estate; and
(4) The power must be exercisable by her alone and in all events,
whether exercisable by will, during life, or both; and
(5) The entire interest or a specific portion thereof must not be subject
to a power in another person to appoint any part to any person other
than the surviving spouse."0
Since the surviving spouse must be entitled to all the income, payable
annually or more frequently, it is implied that the property must be income
19 Care should be taken to properly word the tax clause. Illustrative of difficulties encountered
because of improper wording is Estate of Juster v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 669 (1955). In this
case taxes were to be paid out of the "principal" of the estate. The court ruled that taxes were
payable out of the corpus of the estate prior to distribution, so the marital deduction was reduced.
See also Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F. 2d 734 (10th Cir. 1957).
70
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5); Regs. § 20.2056(b)-5(a).
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producing. However, if, for example, the property includes realty or stock
of a closed corporation, it may not be productive in the sense that income
may not always be forthcoming from the property. If there is a possibilty
that the property may become unproductive, it would be wise to give the
trustee power to dispose, after a reasonable time, of any property which may
be or has become unproductive and to prohibit the trustee from investing in
unproductive property. Thus, any question concerning qualification of the
property for "marital deduction" purposes would be avoided.
After considering the type and amount of property to be included in
Trust A, be certain that all the net income is payable to the surviving spouse,
at least annually, during her life. When the trust contains a large amount
of income-producing property, there appears to be no reason for not making
the income payable in at least quarterly installments. One advantage in pay-
ing income to the beneficiary in more frequent intervals is convenience of the
survivor. This is a special advantage where that person is unfamiliar with
managing and planning in advance for the expenditures of the household.
However, in many cases the income from the property may be somewhat
sporadic, so the interval of payments should not be too close together.
Where it is foreseeable that the income might not be enough to permit
comfortable living by the survivor in the manner she is accumstomed to, it is
suggested that the survivor be given a power to invade the corpus of the trust
in her uncontrolled discretion to the extent of a sum certain each year. If a
person wants to assure himself that the survivor has a right to take corpus
only where it is necessary for her to live comfortably the will could give the
survivor a power to invade the corpus, at her sole discretion, for her main-
tenance, comfort and general welfare. Also, if the anticipated corpus of the
"marital" trust will be comparatively small, the will could provide for inva-
sion of the "non-marital" trust (if one is created), either by the trustee or the
survivor, insofar as practicable, only after the corpus of the "marital" trust is
exhausted. Such a provision would be added assurance that the survivor would
have sufficient funds to maintain herself in the standard to which she was
accustomed.
However, it is stressed that these powers, standing alone, have not been
construed to give the wife an unlimited power of appointment "exercisable
in all events." Hence, without additional phraseology, the property passing
into such a trust would not qualify for the marital deduction. For example,
in Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis,1 where the wife was given the power to
71 252 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
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invade the corpus as she should so "require," the court held the power was not
unlimited and not exercisable in all events by the wife alone because under
Pennsylvania law the power must be exercised "in good faith" 72 and "hon-
estly and fairly." 7' Also, where the trustee was given the power to pay the
principal to the wife "for her maintenance, comfort and general welfare" at
the wife's discretion, the court held that the power was limited under Ohio
law, so no marital deduction was permitted.7" Finally, where the trustee was
given the power to invade the income when the sons attained the age of eight-
een years "in trustee's uncontrolled discretion" to provide for maintenance and
education of the sons, the court held the wife did not have an absolute un-
qualified right to all the income and it was not certain that she would in fact
receive all the income, so the deduction was disallowed. "
With the exception of the past case mentioned the will did not give the
surviving spouse the power to pay the principal to anyone during her life or
upon her death. If, either during life or at death, the surviving spouse had
been given the power to pay the principal to such persons, including her
estate, as she desired, then the trusts would not have deprived the testator's
estate of the deduction.7" The reason for this is that the survivor would then
have a general power of appointment exercisable by her alone and in all
events.77  Prior to 1954 the cases held the power must have been exercisable
by the survivor at her death. Hence, in McGehee v. Commissioner " the
court held that where the husband had no power to dispose of the property
at death, but had power to dispose of all during his lifetime, the deduction
was not allowed. However, after the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 was
enacted,79 the power was considered a general power of appointment if ex-
ercisable during the surviving spouse's lifetime or at her death.80 This part
of the act was retroactive to the initiation of the "marital deduction" clause
72"In re Rumsey's Estate, 287 Pa. 448, 451, 135 At. 119, 120 (1926).
7 Zumbro v. Zumbro, 68 Pa. Super. 600, 603 (1918).
74 Estate of Comer v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1193 (1959). See also Estate of May v. Com-
missioner, 32 T.C. 386 (1959) where the wife was given the power to invade the principal of the
trust in her sole discretion, "not only for necessities but generally for her comfort, happiness and
well-being." And Estate of Noble v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 888 (1959) where the wife had a
power to invade the corpus when she deems "it necessary or expedient in her discretion to use
any of corpus . . . for her maintenance, support and comfort." The courts held these powers
were limited, so the deduction was disallowed. For a general discussion of a life estate with a
power to consume in the surviving spouse, see Golden, supra note 56 at 306.
75 Estate of Weisberger v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. -, No. 26 (1957).
7 6 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1958).
77 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b).
78 28 T.C. 412 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 58-2USTC ir 11,817.
79 September 2, 1958. This Act was known as Title I, H.R. 8381.
80 See McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F. 2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958); Stallworth v. Commissioner,
260 F. 2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); Boyd v. Gray, 175 F. Supp. 57 (W.D.Ky. 1959).
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in 1948 and hence a refund could be claimed for a period of one year after
enactment. 1
The mere fact that the survivor is incompetent at the date of the spouse's
death will not prevent allowance of the deduction. 2 However, in Starrett v.
Commissioner83 the wife was given the right to request payment of the whole
corpus during her life, but the right was to cease when she became legally
incapacitated or upon the appointment of a guardian. The court held this
constituted a power of appointment, but, when viewed at the date of decedent's
death, it was not exercisable by the wife "alone and in all events." This was
a terminating condition which permanently and absolutely ended the wife's
right to take the corpus. In view of this decision it would be unwise for the
will drafter to incorporate such a provision in the power of appointment
clause. In order to properly provide for this situation, the trustee should be
given power to invade the principal at his sole discretion (either at all times,
or only when the survivor becomes incapacitated or when a guardian is ap-
pointed) to provide for the maintenance, comfort, and general welfare of
the wife.
The power of appointment clause should specifically provide that the
survivor may appoint to her estate.8 ' Without this provision, there may be
a question under local law as to whether or not she can appoint to her estate.
Under Pennsylvania law a residuary clause in a wiil exercises all general
power of appointments held by the testator prior to his death, even though the
residuary clause never specifically referred to the power.8" Hence, especially
where you wish the wife to intentionally exercise the power or not exercise
it at all, it would be wise to require her to appoint by specific reference to
the power of appointment given in your will.
A person should always provide for "default takers," in the event that
the survivor does not exercise the power given her. Within this default pro-
vision one should provide that in case of default the death taxes in the sur-
vivor's estate, caused by the inclusion of the Trust A property in her gross
estate, shall be paid from said property prior to distribution to the "default"
takers. This provision is most important where the survivor may have very
little other property in her estate. In addition, it seems only equitable that
payment for increased death taxes be made out of property causing the in-
crease.
81 Section 93 of Technical Amendments Act of 1958.
82 Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 384.
83 223 F. 2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
84 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
85 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(14) (1947).
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In view of the foregoing and the cases which have dealt with the various
phases of the marital deduction under Section 2056, the following is sug-
gested as a typical "marital deduction" trust to be inserted in wills when a
will drafter wants to create a "fractional" share interest.
I give, devise and bequeath all the residue of my estate of whatever nature
and wherever situated, as follows:
Trust A. If my wife, (name) , survives me (and for pur-
poses of this provision I hereby declare my wife shall be deemed to have sur-
vived me where my wife and I die under such circumstances that there is insuf-
ficient evidence to establish who survivedS6), I direct my Executors and Trus-
tees to set aside that fractional share of my residuary estate which will equal the
maximum estate tax marital deduction allowable for federal estate tax pur-
poses,8 7 less the value for federal estate tax purposes of all interests in prop-
erty, if any, which pass or have passed to my wife under other provisions of
this Will or otherwise but only to the extent that such interests are included
in my gross estate for federal estate tax purposes and only to the extent such
interests qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction. 8s The final deter-
minations in the federal estate tax proceedings shall control the computations
necessary to determine this fractional share and only assets qualifying for the
marital deduction shall pass into Trust A. A fractional share interest is in-
tended by this provision. 89
(1) The Trustees shall pay the net income to my wife, (name)
annually or more frequently, for life.
(2) During my wife's life she shall have the power in her sole discretion
to invade the corpus of the Trust to the extent of $5,000 each year. (Op-
tional.)
(3) Upon her death the Trustees shall distribute the corpus to such per-
son or persons, including my wife's estate, in such amounts and upon such
terms, in trust or otherwise, as my wife, (name) , shall appoint
by Will, which refers specifically to the power of appointment created herein
and expressly exercises the same.
80 The "time" clause may be inserted in place of the "simultaneous death" clause.
87 As a reminder, if the estate may be less than $120,000, substitute the following phraseology:
that fractional share of my residuary estate which will be sufficient to reduce the federal estate tax
to its lowest amount, less. ...
88 At this point the exact terms of the fraction could be specifically stated: The numerator
shall consist of the difference between the maximum tax benefits allowable to my estate for federal
tax purposes and the qualifying property which passes or has passed to my wife under the other
provisions of this will or otherwise and have been included in my gross estate. The denominator
shall be the amount of the residue before taxes.
89 Insert any other provisions desired, either at this point or elsewhere, after all possibilities
are considered, including a provision dealing with the executor's discretion to choose the evaluation
date for the federal estate tax return and a provision concerning payment of taxes. Either or both
of these provisions may form a separate paragraph in the Will.
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(4) In default of such appointment, either wholly or partly, the Trustees
shall pay the principal, after payment of death taxes in my wife's estate
caused by the inclusion of this property in her gross estate, to [specifically set
forth the "default takers"].O
As a reminder, the other provisions discussed above should be inserted in the
Will when the situation warrants their inclusion.
RICHARD L. MCCANDLESS.
90 U. S. Treasury Dep't., Letter Ruling issued April 19, 1948, permits a marital deduction
where takers are named in default of exercise.

